The Effect of California’s Carbon Cap and Trade Program on Co-pollutants and Environmental Justice: Evidence from the Electricity Sector [PDF]
Carbon dioxide emissions are globally uniformly mixing pollutants, but the same industrial processes that produce carbon emissions typically also produce co-pollutants, such as NOx and SOx. Environmental Justice (EJ) advocates have expressed concern that California's cap-and-trade program may cause low-income and minority communities to experience greater exposures to these co-pollutants. I use emissions data from almost all power plants in the United States, and a variety of strategies for constructing counterfactual emissions for plants covered by the California program (including a semi-parametric matching estimator and a synthetic control design). None of these methods suggests that California's carbon cap-and-trade program has increased average co-pollutant emissions. If anything, average co-pollutant emissions may have decreased. From the EJ perspective, average co-pollutant emissions at plants located in low-income or minority communities covered by the program have not gone up relative to co-pollutant emissions at plants in similar communities outside of California.
Non-governmental entities such as businesses and universities have adapted voluntary internal carbon-pricing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, finance carbon reduction programs, signal sustainability and prepare for future mandatory carbon reductions. Little however is known about individual preferences for the introduction of these programs, or how preferences for these programs vary across potential program designs. We conduct a stated preference survey in the form of an advisory referendum on different potential internal carbon-pricing programs at a large public university. Individuals choose between hypothetical programs which vary by their cost, emission reductions, type of fees charged, and use of revenue. We use this data to estimate a random utility model of consumer willingness-to-pay for internal carbon pricing that varies by program feature. Our model is also flexible enough to allow for benefit transfer exercises to campuses with differences in political attitude, income and other variables. Administrative data on both respondents and non-respondents allows us to adjust our estimates for systematic differences in response-rates that may be correlated with willingness-to-pay.
Works in Progress
“Willingness to Pay for Co-Benefits in Carbon Pricing: Evidence from a General Population Survey of Oregon” (With Trudy Ann Cameron)
“Assessing Support for University Internal Carbon Pricing Using Benefit Transfer” (With Trudy Ann Cameron)